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Abstract
We consider a simple information-theoretic model of communication, in which
two species of bacteria have the option of exchanging information about their envi-
ronment, thereby improving their chances of survival. For this purpose, we model
a system consisting of two species whose dynamics in the world are modelled by a
bet-hedging strategy. It is well known that such models lend themselves to elegant
information-theoretical interpretations by relating their respective long-term growth
rate to the information the individual species has about its environment. We are
specifically interested in modelling how this dynamics are affected when the species
interact cooperatively or in an antagonistic way in a scenario with limited resources.
For this purpose, we consider the exchange of environmental information between
the two species in the framework of a game. Our results show that a transition from
a cooperative to an antagonistic behaviour in a species results as a response to a
change in the availability of resources. Species cooperate in abundance of resources,
while they behave antagonistically in scarcity.
1 Introduction
Information is a central concept in biology. The ability of living organisms to acquire and
process information about their environment is essential for their survival and reproduc-
tion. This is particularly crucial for organisms living in fluctuating environments, where
they face the challenge of adapting to unpredictable circumstances. The failure of a species
population to anticipate such changes could be fatal, eventually leading the species to ex-
tinction. In environments where reliable cues that a species requires to survive are present,
sensing the environment may eliminate environmental uncertainty, allowing the species
to adopt a suitable phenotype for the current conditions. However, when uncertainty re-
mains in the environment, a species will follow a bet-hedging strategy [60, 58], where it
tries to maximise its long-term growth rate by adopting different phenotypes for each of
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the possible environmental conditions, in proportions based on the information about the
environment they possess. The classic example of bet-hedging in biology is Cohen’s model
of seed dormancy, where a seed germinates stochastically in different periods relative to
the probability of rainfalls [9].
The relation between information and long-term growth rate was first formalized by
Kelly using the example of a horse race, where a gambler receiving side information about
the race maximises its capital’s long-term growth rate by betting proportionally to the
updated probabilities each horse has of winning [29]. The same principle was considered
in models of evolution of biological systems living in fluctuating environments [12, 34,
9], and the relationship between information and long-term growth rate was analysed in
information-theoretic terms in [30, 4, 5, 15, 14, 56], where it is shown that an increase
in environmental information of a species is translated into an increase in its long-term
growth rate.
Bacteria, as many other organisms living in fluctuating environments, must constantly
make adaptive decisions in order to survive [46, 2]. For instance, bacteria have the ability
to switch its phenotype to a more suited one when facing a change in environmental
conditions [16, 1, 33, 18, 36]. The decision to adopt a particular phenotype is based
upon its information about the environment, and when the future conditions cannot be
perfectly predicted, bacteria will hedge their bets [66, 3]. This stochastic decision-making
process, where a cell adopts a phenotype with a certain probability, can be considered as
the outcome of a complex internal biochemical network, and therefore as an evolvable trait
[63, 46, 36].
Besides sensing environmental factors such as temperature, oxygen, pH levels, etc.,
bacteria also obtain information about their environment by detecting concentration levels
of diffusable cues released by the same bacterial species or by other species of bacteria
[19, 62, 40]. This process is commonly known as quorum sensing, although the original
interpretation was more restrictive. Originally, the diffusable cues were only considered
as an indicator of cell density, where a sufficiently large concentration of these cues would
indicate that a quorum of cells was achieved [19, 62]. This quorum allows bacteria to
perform diverse physiological activities such as secretion of virulence factors, formation of
biofilms, conjugation, sporulation and bioluminiscence [40, 25].
Since the introduction of quorum sensing, other uses for diffusable cues by bacteria
have been found. For instance, in diffusion sensing, bacteria employ cues to monitor
diffusion in their environment [52]. Another study relates bacterial cues to pH levels in the
environment, a process called diel sensing, which, due to pH fluctuations, shows a daily
cycle [11]. A list of different uses for diffusable cues by bacteria can be found in [49],
where they propose to utilise the term quorum sensing to refer to these processes, without
restricting its meaning to a method of measuring cell density. Instead, the term should
be considered as a general method to indirectly obtain information about environmental
factors that influence the accumulation and perception of the cues.
Considering this, we propose a theoretical model which combines the two mentioned
aspects of bacteria: bet-hedging and cell-to-cell communication, where cells exchange in-
formation about the environmental conditions on which they depend and are trying to pre-
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dict. We will neither attempt to model any particular mechanism to integrate the different
sources of environmental information, nor intend to model how a cell chooses a phenotype.
Instead, we will model the dynamics of bacteria cells in a generic information-theoretic
framework, such that bacterial communication becomes an illustrative interpretation of a
general model of growth with information exchange in a scenario with limited resources.
Other interpretations of the model are discussed in Sec. 4. Information theory [59] allows
general high-level descriptions of systems, permitting to hide away irrelevant details for the
purposes of a model [50, 42]. In particular, information theory provides a natural frame-
work to analyse cells’ decision-making processes in uncertainty where the mechanisms need
not to be modelled [38, 68, 6, 55].
In taking this view, we focus on the emergent behaviours related to information ex-
change between two species of bacteria following a bet-hedging strategy in a scenario with
limited resources. In our model, the consumption of resources as well as the amount of envi-
ronmental information (from the same and from the other species) are density-dependent.
Larger populations can potentially share more environmental information than smaller
ones, increasing the long-term growth rate of recipient cells. Thus, a species can actively
increase the information about the environment it could perceive in the future, by sharing
information with the other species, thereby increasing its population. On the other hand,
larger populations consume more resources, which affects the survival of a species’ popula-
tion, and therefore the environmental information the cells in the population acquire. We
analyse this trade-off through a game, where two species of bacterial cells competing for
resources have the option to share all of their environmental information with the other
species.
Other game-theoretical models have also considered dynamical payoffs [65, 57, 32, 53,
54]. In particular, [53, 54] considered a model based on limited resources, achieving qual-
itatively similar results. Both in their work and ours, there is a transition in the domi-
nant strategy resulting from a change in the availability of resources. This transition is
from a game equivalent to a Prisoner’s Dilemma, where defection is dominant, to a Har-
mony Game, where cooperation dominates. In this study, we present a model from an
information-theoretic perspective.
While the majority of evolutionary game-theoretical models assume species with fixed
strategies during their lifetime, and then analyse the composition of the resulting popula-
tion (cooperators vs. defectors), here we want to study which are the best communication
strategies for a species based on the information it has about its context. Where optimal
strategies for communication exist, they would serve as an indication of which behaviours
of a species evolution would favour. For other cases, we discuss possible modifications of
the model in order to study them.
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2 Model
2.1 Overview
We consider a model where two different species of bacteria can sense complementary infor-
mation about their environment and have the ability to share that information with other
species. Both species follow a bet-hedging strategy, where the environmental information
they obtain is translated into growth rate. Therefore, the more information about their
environment they obtain, the higher their growth rate will be. We want to study whether
the species would communicate (cooperate) or behave antagonistically in scenarios where
they both depend on a common resource for their survival.
For this purpose, we consider a minimal model that is able to capture the commu-
nication behaviour of a species. We imagine an environment that can be in one of four
equally likely states (i.e. its entropy is 2 bits) and that each species can potentially sense
only one of the two bits. In this way, species depend on each other to eliminate (approx-
imately) their environmental uncertainty, creating a mutual interest in their survival. In
addition, we assume that each individual cell can measure its corresponding bit with only
85% accuracy.
We consider two types of communication that can help bacteria obtain more informa-
tion about the environment: (a) within-species communication, in which each member of
the population can integrate completely the information from all other members of the
population (so that even though each individual can sense the species-specific environmen-
tal bit with only 85% accuracy, several bacteria from the same species can talk to each
other to obtain close to the entire bit). Thus, the total information available to an individ-
ual increases with population size. (b) between-species communication, in which a receiver
species can incorporate all the information from the individuals of the sender-species. As
before, the amount of information that is available increases with the population size.
We assume that all the information shared, either within- or between-species, is fully
interpretable by the receiver, and thus can always be translated into growth rate (via
improving their bet-hedging strategy). This is an idealisation that allow us to focus on
communication strategies rather than on the interpretation of information. Furthermore,
in order to give both species the option of not communicating with the other species,
while still being able to communicate with members of its own species, we assume three
different chemical languages: each species communicate through its own particular lan-
guage, which cannot be understood by the other species; and we assume a joint language
for between-species communication. All communication happens through an idealised non
noisy-channel.
We want to study how scenarios with limited resources for bacteria affects their com-
municating behaviour. For this purpose, we consider a game where, under the assumption
that within-species communication always happen, we give the option to each species to
share their environmental information with the other species.
In the system, at each time-step, the available resources are distributed among the
species such that an equal proportion of both species’ populations survive. This eliminates
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favouritism towards a species, assuming an unstructured distribution of resources. Then, if
resources are enough for both populations, then all of them survive. Of those that consumed
resources, the ones that match the demands of the environmental conditions further survive
and reproduce. The proportion of a population that matches the environment will depend
on how much information each individual has: in the ideal case where all of them know the
future environmental condition, 100% of the population that consumed resources survives
and reproduce.
Then, if a species shares information with the other, the latter will increase its growth
rate, since it will improve its prediction of the environmental conditions. This can be
beneficial for the species that shared information, since by increasing the other species’
population size, it increases the amount of environmental information that the latter can
potentially share back to the former. We note here that we are considering at least a second
order process, where the consequences of a species can only be perceived at a later stage.
However, increasing the other species’ growth rate have the disadvantage that resources are
depleted at a faster rate. This trade-off between environmental information and resources
is what we study here through a game-theoretic scenario.
2.2 Model introduction and outline
Let us give an introduction to the model, which mainly describes the relations between
the variables of the system shown in Fig. 1. Our system consists of populations of two
species of bacterial cells, X and Y , both living in the same environment and depending
on the same set of environmental conditions for survival. We assume temporarily varying
conditions, and, therefore, at each time-step, one of these environmental conditions occur.
We model the environmental conditions at time-step t by a random variable Et with four
states, where p(et) is the probability of condition et to occur.
Each individual cell of each species acquires information about the environment through
its sensors, which are denoted SXit for a cell i of species X at time-step t, and SYjt for a
cell j of species Y at time-step t. We denote the sensors of the population of species X
at time-step t by the random variable SXt , and the sensors of the population of species Y
at time-step t by SYt (the sensor variable of a population is a function of the individual
sensors, we will explain later how this is computed).
The number of individual cells of species X (Y ) that acquire environmental informa-
tion at time-step t is a function of the population density Xt (Yt). However, only the
proportion pt of the population that consume resources (and therefore survives) is able
to capture information about the environment. When resources are not sufficient for the
consumption of both populations, we assume that both population densities are reduced
by a proportionality factor pt. This factor depends on the available resources (introduced
later in Sec. 2.6.2), as well as on the population densities.
Now, the rate at which species X grow at time-step t is given by δXt , and depends
on the amount of environmental information of the population at that time-step. This
information can increase if, for instance, species Y shares its environmental information
with X. Moreover, if species X shares back information with species Y , then species
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Et Et+1 Et+2
SXt SXt+1 SXt+2
Xt Xt+1 Xt+2
SYt SYt+1 SYt+2
Yt Yt+1 Yt+2
. . .
. . .
pt pt+1 pt+2
pt pt+1 pt+2
δXt δXt+1 δXt+2
δYt δYt+1 δYt+2
Figure 1: Bayesian network describing the relation between the main variables of the model. Et
denotes the environmental conditions at time-step t, Sxt (Syt) the sensors of species X (Y ) at
time-step t, and Xt (Yt) the population density of species X (Y ) at time-step t.
Y would have increased its growth rate by sharing information in a previous time-step.
However, larger populations consume more resources, and Y ’s growth rate may decrease as
a consequence of sharing information. Therefore, different strategies are optimal depending
on initial conditions, and this is what we will study using a game-theoretical framework.
In the following sections we explain the model in detail. The dynamics of the popula-
tion are defined in Sec. 2.4. In Sec. 2.5, we explain how cells acquire information about
their environment. The information is obtained from three exclusive sources: from envi-
ronmental cues not related to bacteria (these cues infer different sensor states on bacteria,
see Sec. 2.5.1); from communicated information from cells of the same species (within-
species communication, see Sec. 2.5.2); and from communicated information from cells
of the other species (between-species communication, see Sec. 2.5.3). In Sec. 2.6, we
show how the environmental information each cell obtains, when a bet-hedging strategy
is followed, translates into the long-term growth rate of a population. Finally, we study
through a game presented in Sec. 2.7 the optimal communication behaviour of the species
in different scenarios.
2.3 Environment
Our system consists of populations of two species of bacterial cells, X and Y , both living
in the same environment and depending on the same set of environmental conditions for
survival. These conditions are assumed to be independent of bacterial populations, and
therefore are not affected by their consumption or production of substances in the environ-
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ment. For instance, bacteria may need to adapt its phenotype to a change in temperature,
or in pH levels, sugar concentration, or any combination of environmental factors. While
the range of these variables may be in the continuum, we assume a partition of the range
into relevant states for the organism survival.
We assume temporarily varying conditions, and, therefore, at each time-step, one of
these environmental conditions occur. We model the environmental conditions at time-step
t by a random variable Et with four states, where p(et) is the probability of condition et to
occur. Without loss of generality, we assume Et to be uniformly distributed. Additionally,
we assume environmental conditions to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
in time.
2.4 Population dynamics
We model the dynamics of populations of species X and Y by logistic maps :{
Xt+1 = δXt Xt (1−Xt)
Yt+1 = δYt Yt (1− Yt) (1)
where Xt and Yt represent the population density of species X and Y at time t, respec-
tively. The density is the ratio of the existing population to the carrying capacity, which
in our case is set to to 1 for both populations.
The logistic map is a simple non-linear difference equation with complex behaviour,
generally used in ecology and biology to model population growth, but also used in other
research areas, such as genetics, epidemiology and economics [37]. This equation has in-
teresting properties that makes it attractive to use, such as proportional growth at low
densities and asymptotic growth at high densities. The value δX and δY are the rates
at which population X and Y grows, respectively, which depend on the amount of envi-
ronmental information each species have obtained. For non-trivial dynamical behaviour,
1 < δX < 4 and 1 < δY < 4 is required [37]. We will use values such that 0 < δX ≤ 2 and
0 < δY ≤ 2, assuming 2 as a reproductive limit. To define the growth rate of a species, we
first need to compute how much information about the environment it acquires, which we
do in the following section.
2.5 Environmental information of an individual cell
In this section we define how we compute the amount of information an individual cell
obtains from each of the possible sources we are considering: its sensors, information
shared by individuals of the same species, and information shared by individuals of the
other species. We recall that an individual would obtain more environmental information
when the density of the population of the communicating species is larger. The densities
of the populations are given by Eq. 1.
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2.5.1 Sensory information of individual cells
Each individual cell of both species sense cues from the environment. We represent the
sensors of an individual cell i of species X as a random variable SXi , and the sensors of
an individual cell j of species Y as a random variable SYj . We define the conditional
probabilities Pr (SXi | E) for every individual i of species X and Pr
(
SYj
∣∣ E) for every
individual j of species Y in the system, and thus we can measure the amount of information
that each individual acquires from the environment by computing the mutual information
between its sensor variable and the environmental variable (see A for information-theoretic
definitions). These values are bounded by the entropy of the environment, which in our
case is H(E) = 2 bits.
In order to avoid giving an advantage to a species, we assume that all individuals of
both species acquire the same amount of environmental information (this becomes impor-
tant later when this amount is translated into long-term growth rate). Nevertheless, the
difference between the two species is in the aspects of environmental information that they
capture, as shown in the conditional probabilities Eq. 2 and Eq. 3. Individuals of species
X capture information only about two states of the environment E, being unable to sense
the other two states. On the contrary, individuals of species Y capture information only
about the two states species X cannot sense, while being unable to sense the other two
states. The amount of information about the environment that an individual i of species
X captures is I(E ; SXi) = 0.39016 bits, the same amount as an individual j of species
Y , I(E ; SYj) = 0.39016 bits, although the intersection of the information each of them
capture is I(SXi ; SYj) = 0 bits. We explain in the next sections how this assumption
influences the total environmental information an individual cell can acquire, while we
analyse how it affects the results obtained from our model in D.
Pr (SXi | E) :=

s1 s2
e1 0.85 0.15
e2 0.85 0.15
e3 0.15 0.85
e4 0.15 0.85
 (2) Pr (SYj ∣∣ E) :=

s1 s2
e1 0.85 0.15
e2 0.15 0.85
e3 0.85 0.15
e4 0.15 0.85
 (3)
2.5.2 Environmental information of an individual cell obtained from within-
species communication
Let us consider an individual cell i of bacterial species X. The amount of information,
on average, this cell obtains from its sensors is I(E ; SXi). Now, if another cell j 6= i of
species X communicates with its own species’ population (as, for instance, by releasing
a molecule into the extracellular environment), then, assuming cells of the same species
share the same language, the information about the environment of species i increases (as
well as that of the rest of the population). The total amount of information about the
environment for an individual cell i of species X when another cell j 6= i communicates
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information is, on average, I(E ; SXi , SXj), and the increase in environmental information
for cell i is I
(
E ; SXj
∣∣ SXi) (see Fig. 2).
The assumption about a common language that perfectly conveys the sensory state of a
cell is an important one, and it allow us to simplify the model by ignoring the relationship
between sensor states and output signals (which are implicitly assumed to be one-to-one in
this model). A further important assumption we make regarding the population structure
is that all cells perceive what other cells communicate.
As more cells communicate, the environmental information of all cells increases as shown
in Fig. 3 (see label I(E ; SX1 , . . . , SXn)), considering a carrying capacity of N = 15 cells.
In the same way, the amount of environmental information of cells of species Y increases
with each individual exactly as it does in species X (see label I(E ; SY1 , . . . , SYm)), with
the same carrying capacity M as species X, M = 15 (this choice of value is discussed in
D). In Fig. 2, we show in a different way how the environmental information of individuals
increases when there is within-species communication. Each species captures exclusive bits
of environmental information, and thus when individuals of the same species communicate,
they can only reduce the uncertainty of one bit of environmental information.
Note that the computational complexity of the mutual information grows exponentially
with the number of individual cells communicating information. Since each individual cell
can be in two states, the total number of states of the whole population is 215 states.
However, we can take advantage of the fact that the probability distribution Pr (SXi | E)
is the same for any Xi ∈ [1, 15], and thus the probability of a particular state of the
population depend only on the frequencies of the states of the individuals. In this way,
the total number of possible states of a population grows linearly with population size,
and we can represent the states of a population conditioned on environmental conditions
more efficiently, as we explain in B. The same reasoning is also valid for representing the
population of species Y . The choice of 15 as the carrying capacity of both populations was
made in order to reduce computational costs.
Finally, since both species live in the same niche, we will assume exclusive means of
communication for the species, i.e. the chemical language used by species X and Y has no
overlap. Nevertheless, we consider a common language for between-species communication.
Scenarios where bacteria use different chemical languages for within- or between-species
communication are common. For instance, the bacterium Vibrio harveyi uses two different
autoinducer signals to regulate light production and other target outputs; one mediating
within-species communication, and the other between-species communication [17].
2.5.3 Environmental information of an individual cell obtained from between-
species communication
In the same way as last section, individual cells also obtain information from cells of the
other species. Again, we need to assume a common code between the species. However, as
stated before, the chemical language used for between-species communication need to be
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first bit of E second bit of E
I(E;SX3 |SX1 , SX2 )
I(E;SX2 |SX1 )
I(E;SX1)
I(E;SY3 |SY1 , SY2 )
I(E;SY2 |SY1 )
I(E;SY1)
environmental information E
Figure 2: Diagram sketching the environmental information each species captures, and
how this varies when there is within-species communication. Individuals of species X
capture information only about the first bit of E, while individuals of species Y capture
information only about the second bit of E. When, for instance, individuals of species
X communicate with each other, their environmental information increases, but it only
eliminates uncertainty about the first bit. In the same way, individuals of species Y
communicating with each other can only increase their environmental information about
the second bit of E.
different from both of the within-species communication languages. Then, an individual
cell i of species X acquiring communicated environmental information from cell j of species
X and cell k from species Y will have an amount equal to I(E;SXi , SXj , SYk). In Fig. 3
we show the amounts of environmental information an individual cell acquires in different
scenarios: with only sensory information, with within-species communication and with
between-species communication.
Let us note that, since each species is specialised to capture different aspects of the
environment, the contribution (from a cell’s perspective) of a first cell of the other species
is significantly higher (in terms of environmental information) than that of a cell of the
same species. This can be appreciated in Fig. 2: if we consider an individual cell 1 of
species X, its environmental information is I(E;SX1) = 0.39016 bits. If cell 1 of species Y
communicates information, then the total amount of information for cell 1 of species X is
I(E;SX1 , SY1) = I(E;SX1) + I(E;SY1) = 0.78032 bits (since I(SX1 ;SY1) = 0 bits); while if
a cell of the same species shares information, the increase in environmental information is
I(E;SX2|SX1) = 0.209267 bits, in the same way that if another cell 2 of the other species
share information, the increase is I(E;SY2|SY1) = 0.209267 bits.
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population size of species X (n) and Y (m)
H(E)
I(E;SXi), I(E;SYj )
I(E;SX1 , . . . , SXn), I(E;SY1 , . . . , SYm)
I(E;SX1 , . . . , SXn , SY1 , . . . , SYm)
Figure 3: Total amount of environmental information for different scenarios: H(E) is the
uncertainty of the environment, I(E;SXi) and I(E;SYj) correspond to the case where an
individual cell i of species X and an individual cell j of species Y acquire information
from their sensors only, respectively. I(E;SX1 , . . . , SXn) is the total amount of information
of each cell of species X when n cells communicate; in the same way I(E;SY1 , . . . , SYm)
is the total amount of information of each cell of species Y when m cells communicate.
I(E;SX1 , . . . , SXn , SY1 , . . . , SYm) is the total amount of environmental information each cell
of both population have when n cells of species X and m cells of species Y communicate.
2.6 Bet-hedging on environmental conditions
2.6.1 Long-term growth rate of a bacterial population
Bacterial cells in our system adopt one of a set of possible phenotypes at each time-step.
For each possible environmental condition, we assume there is only one phenotype that
meets its demands and thus allows the cell to survive. Then, cells adopting a phenotype
other than the one that meets the demands of the current environmental conditions die out.
This simplifying assumption will allow us to express the relationship between environmental
information and long-term growth rate in a more elegant way. We explain in Sec. 2.6.1
the consequences to our model of removing this assumption. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the environmental conditions and the phenotypes are labelled from the
set {1, 2, 3, 4}. We define the reproduction rate f of a bacterial cell adopting phenotype ϕ
when the environmental condition et occur as the following function:
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f(ϕ, et) =
{
2 if ϕ = et
0 otherwise
(4)
Bacterial cells are complex organisms, with intricate biochemical networks. As it is
recognised in several studies, these internal networks in bacteria enable predictive behaviour
in a probabilistic fashion [35, 63, 46]. Then, individual cells will develop one of its possible
phenotypes with some probability, and we regard the probability distribution over the
phenotypes as the betting strategy pi of an individual cell. Which strategy do cells follow?
As it is shown in theoretical [14] as well as empirical [3] studies, the optimal strategy
is achieved by the proportional betting scheme pi = p (see [14, 10] for a full treatment).
Using a notation similar to that used in [10], the optimal long-term growth rate of a species
depending on conditions E with reproduction rate f is given by:
W ∗f (E) = F −H(E) (5)
Here, F =
∑
e
p(e) log f(e, e). When a species acquires extra information C about the
environment, then the long-term growth rate is given by:
W ∗f (E | C) = F −H (E | C) (6)
= F −H(E) + I(E ; C) (7)
Equation 6 shows the optimal long-term growth rate for populations living in environ-
mental conditions E perceiving environmental cues C. F is an upper bound given by the
expected reproduction rate. H (E | C) is the remaining environmental uncertainty of each
cell of the population given environmental cues C. Equation 7 shows the value of environ-
mental cues C in the long-term growth rate, namely I(E ; C). However, if there is at least
one phenotype meeting the demands of more than one environmental conditions, then the
value of C in the long-term growth rate when species follow a bet-hedging strategy is not
exactly I(E ; C), but it is bounded by this value [14]. Moreover, for some non-diagonal
functions of the reproduction rate f , bet-hedging is not the optimal strategy that max-
imises the long-term growth rate [14]. Therefore, our assumption that there is only one
phenotype in each species that meet the demands of each of the environmental conditions
and thus survives to reproduce allows us to provide the optimal betting strategy for any
case, also allowing a clear expression of the increase in long-term growth rate.
As a final remark, the value F always equals 1, and the growth rate of a population
when it has no environmental information is 2F−H(E) = 21−2 = 1/2, which means that
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1/4 of the population survives and reproduces, which is the probability for an individual
cell to develop a suitable phenotype by choosing one randomly. On the other hand, when
the uncertainty of the environment is eliminated, let us assume by the perception of en-
vironmental cues C, then the growth rate of a population is 2F−H(E|C) = 21−0 = 2, i.e.
the whole population survives and reproduces, since they are all able to perfectly predict
future environmental conditions.
2.6.2 Growth rate of a bacterial population per time-step
We now define the growth rate δXt of a species X at time-step t, and the growth rate δYt of
species Y at time-step t. Instead of computing the growth rate of a species in one particular
environment, we consider the average growth over all possible environments. The growth
rate at time-step t when a species considers the information C is given by:
δt := 2
W ∗f (E | C) (8)
For instance, the growth rate of species X when n individuals share information only
within their species is δXt = 2
W ∗f (E|SX1t ,...,SXnt ). In a similar way, the long-term growth in
one time-step of species Y when m individuals share information only within their species
is δYt = 2
W ∗f (E|SY1t ,...,SYmt ). Here, n needs to be related to Xt (the current population density
of species X) and m needs to be related to Yt (the current population density of species
Y ).
In our model, population densities are represented by real values in the range [0, 1],
and we need to map this range to a number of individual cells to able to compute the
long-term growth rate, which requires computing values I(E;SX1t , . . . , SXnt ) for nt indi-
viduals of species X and I(E;SY1t , . . . , SYmt ) for mt individuals of species Y . However,
only the individuals that are able to consume resources (and therefore survive) sense the
environment. The proportion of individuals that consume resources at time-step t is given
by
pt :=
{
1 if Rt > Xt + Yt
Rt
Xt+Yt
otherwise
(9)
In Eq. 9, both populations survive if resources are sufficient for their consumption.
However, when they are not sufficient, the proportion of each population that survives is
proportional to the ratio of resources to the sum of the population densities. The dynamics
of the resources is defined as follows:
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Rt+1 :=
{
α
(
Rt − (Xt + Yt)
)
if Rt − (Xt + Yt) > 0
0 otherwise
(10)
In Eq. 10, the resources are depleted relative to the population densities, and, if there
are any left, they grow by a factor α. Once resources are depleted, they remain in that
state. In appendix 24, we consider resources that are periodically replenished instead of
the dynamics described above.
Now we can compute the number of individuals that sense the environment at time-step
t, which is given by nt = pt×Xt×N for species X and mt = pt×Yt×M for species Y (N and
M are the assumed carrying capacity for the population of species X and Y , respectively).
As stated earlier, when nt andmt are integers, we can represent the conditional probabilities
for the populations, Pr(SXt|E) and Pr(SYt |E), as explained in B. However, when one or
both of these values are not integers, we represent the conditional probabilities Pr(SXt |E)
and Pr(SYt |E) by interpolating between bntc and bnt + 1c individuals for species X and
between bmtc and bmt + 1c individuals for species Y . How we interpolate is explained in
detail in C. Ideally, we would define a higher carrying capacity for both populations (instead
of N = M = 15, the value we use in our simulations), and then we would not need to
interpolate values. However, since computation costs grow exponentially, we overcome
this difficulty by defining a small carrying capacity and simulating “intermediate” sizes of
the population. In any case, what matters in our model is the amount of environmental
information of each species, rather than the actual amount of individuals composing the
population.
2.7 Game between the species
2.7.1 Introduction
In order to study the communication behaviour of the species, we set up a game where
they can either share information (cooperate), or behave antagonistically. The goal of each
species is to maximise their growth rate for a local look-ahead. We explain below
why species need a look-ahead for making decisions related to communication, and how
this relates to species that bet to maximise their long-term growth rate.
The game we propose here differs from traditional evolutionary game theory in that, in
our model, an organism does not have an inherited (and fixed during its lifetime) strategy.
Instead, we consider species whose communication behaviour depends and changes on the
context.
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The context of the species is composed of several variables: population densities, re-
source concentration, and other environmental conditions. How these variables change
in time is determined by the system’s dynamics. Our aim is to find optimal strategies
for communication in different contexts, and these would serve as an indication of which
communication behaviours of a species evolution would favour.
There are two important assumptions in this approach that we take: first, the species
have complete knowledge of the current population densities and resource concentration,
but their knowledge about other environmental conditions (which are relevant for their
survival) depends on information that is communicated by the same/other species. Ideally,
we would consider all of these factors as environmental information that a species needs
to obtain by communicating (for instance, quorum sensing obtains densities estimates),
but here we do not – only the survival-relevant environment state is assumed unknown to
permit application of the Kelly-gambling model.
Second, the species is capable of processing the contextual information. Having com-
plete knowledge of the former mentioned variables is not sufficient for an organism to make
a decision regarding its communication behaviour. A species would need some mechanism
(e.g. epigenetic mechanisms) that functions as a model for the dynamics of the system the
species inhabits. We argue below that in order for bacteria to perceive the effects of their
actions (sharing or not sharing information) in the rest of the system, at least a two-step
look-ahead is necessary. In other words, the mechanism needs to be a second-order process.
We are not modelling this mechanism in this paper. Instead, we are using the system’s
dynamics as a best case scenario for the species to make decisions. Of course, bacteria
would not have such a detailed internal mechanism, it would be a simplified model of
the dynamics that is sufficient for predicting variables of interest. However, the system’s
dynamics sets the limit of what is achievable in terms of optimal decisions, and when
a species have less information about the relevant variables, their decision-making will
necessarily be worse.
Finally, in the system’s dynamics, species follow a bet-hedging strategy that maximises
the long-term growth rate. In the game, however, species maximise their growth rate for a
defined look-ahead. There is no conflict with these assumptions: the former is a strategy
related to how species bet on environmental conditions; the latter is about whether a
species should share information or not. Independently of the look-ahead we are using,
and under the current assumptions, species always do proportional betting.
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2.7.2 Species’ look-ahead
For this study, we assume both species consider only a local look-ahead, and thus the
horizon we will be considering in the computations is intentionally finite. For any given
initial conditions Rt, Xt and Yt, the growth rate of a species’ population at that time-step
depends on the population’s sensory information together with the shared information from
the other species (which depends on the other species’ communication strategy). Therefore,
any strategy a species may take (whether it shares information with the other species or
not) would not influence its immediate payoff (i.e. its growth rate), and hence the model
does not provide an insight into how communication strategies interact with evolution. On
the other hand, if we consider species with foresight, then their strategies would indirectly
affect their payoffs, and here it then makes sense to analyse whether a species would share
information or not.
A species that shares all of their environmental information would increase the growth
rate of the other species. For instance, if species Y shares all the information it has available
with species X at time-step t, then W ∗f (Et | SXt , SYt) = Ft − H(Et) + I(Et ; SXt) +
I (Et ; SYt | SXt); if it does not share any information, then W ∗f (Et | SXt) = Ft−H(Et) +
I(Et ; SXt), which is clearly less or equal than the former value. Now, if we consider a
species that maximises their growth rate at the next time-step, t+1, then a species’ payoff
is, let us say for species X when species Y shares information at time-step t+ 1:
W ∗f
(
Et+1
∣∣ SXt+1 , SYt+1) = Ft+1−H(Et+1)+I(Et+1 ; SXt+1)+I (Et+1 ; SYt+1 ∣∣ SXt+1) (11)
In this equation, the terms SXt+1 and SYt+1 both depend on species X and Y ’s decisions
at time-step t, and on species Y ’s decision at time-step t+1, but not on species X’s decision
at time-step t+ 1. Let us note W ∗Xt as the growth rate of species X at time-step t. While
we could consider W ∗Xt+1 as the value to maximise by species X, it will not reflect the
consequences of the decision taken by species X at time-step t + 1. In other words, this
value will be always equal for different sequences of actions (those where X shares in the
last time-step, and those where X do not share in the last time-step).
On the other hand, if we consider longer (finite) decision horizons, we will incur into
the same problem: the last action does not affect one’s payoff. For this reason, at time-
step t + horizon, we consider the payoff to be the growth rate when the other species
do not share information, in a worst-case scenario for the species. In this way, all of the
actions of both species influence the payoffs. Since in this study we are considering a
second-order process, the minimal horizon that would show any interesting behaviour in
the communication strategies is 2. For economy in the computations and simplicity, we
will use this value for the horizon.
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2.7.3 Payoff matrix
The payoff for species X is given by
W ∗X(Et+2|SXt+2) = Ft+2 −H(Et+2) + I(Et+2;SXt+2) (12)
In Eq. 12, the values of Ft+2 and H(Et+2) are fixed. The value of SXt+2 , however,
depends on all the previous decisions taken by both species. Therefore, the payoff matrix
will be composed of 16 values, since we are using a look-ahead equal to 2. This payoff matrix
corresponds to the most accurate information a species could have to make a decision
regarding whether it should share information or not. It is the most accurate because it is
obtained from the model itself, instead of from an organism’s internal approximation. An
example of a payoff matrix is shown in Box 1.
To get an intuition on how the game will be played, we can imagine two opposite
situations: first, with abundant resources, if a species shares information in the first time-
step, it will help the other species to improve their predictions, and then the collective
information of a larger population of the latter species may be “fed back” into the former
species. We should note that, since resources are abundant, there is no damage for a
species to share information, even if the other species do not share back. In the other case,
we consider scarce resources, and then sharing information has two opposite effects: first,
it increases the potential information that can be shared back, as we improve the other
species’ predictions on the environment, but it also decreases the total amount of available
resources, which affects the information that both species capture. This trade-off between
resources and environmental information is what we analyse in the following section.
3 Results
We analysed the resulting payoff matrix described above for 250× 250× 300 initial values
(contexts) uniformly distributed in [0, 1]× [0, 1]× [0, 3] (the range of population density of
species X times the range of population density of species Y times the range of resources’
values). We look in these matrices for dominant strategies for species X (see Box 1 for
strategic dominance definitions). The parameters used (those which were not yet defined)
are α = 1.05, N = M = 15. In appendix D we discuss the sensitivity of the parameters
and the generality of the results obtained. In appendix E we consider different dynamics
for the resources in our simulations, where resources are replenished periodically instead
of growing by a factor α.
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Box 1. Strategic dominance definitions.
The payoff matrix consists of 16 values, where each value corresponds to the growth rate of species
X. Each value results from the decisions of each species of sharing or not their environmental
information in two time-steps. Below is an example of a payoff matrix resulting in not sharing
information being strictly dominant (see definition below) for species X, with initial values R = 1.0,
X = 0.304 and Y = 0.392.
-0.99890773 -0.99907912 -0.99889800 -0.99907118
-0.99911144 -0.99926619 -0.99910257 -0.99925910
-0.99891489 -0.99908596 -0.99890519 -0.99907805
-0.99911738 -0.99927174 -0.99910854 -0.99926468
n, n n, s s, n s, s
n, n
n, s
s, n
s, s
Species Y
S
p
ec
ie
s
X
We note s as the action “share information” and n as the action “do not share information”. Then,
for instance, (n, s), is a short expression of “not sharing in the first time-step, and sharing in the
second time-step”. Let v, w be strategies in {(n, n), (n, s), (s, n), (s, s)}. The payoff of species X when
species X plays strategy v and species Y plays strategy w is represented by ux(v, w).
We say a strategy v∗ ∈ {(n, n), (n, s), (s, n), (s, s)} is strictly dominant if
∀v′ ∈ {(n, n), (n, s), (s, n), (n, n)}, v′ 6= v∗, we have that ux(v∗, w) > ux(v′, w) (13)
We say a strategy v∗ ∈ {(n, n), (n, s), (s, n), (s, s)} is weakly dominant if
∀v′ ∈ {(n, n), (n, s), (s, n), (n, n)}, v′ 6= v∗, we have that ux(v∗, w) ≥ ux(v′, w) (14)
with at least one strategy v′ giving a strict inequality.
In Fig. 4, we show a classification of the initial values of R, X and Y based on the
resulting payoff matrices. The plots shown are the result of computing the convex hull on
the classified points, and for this reason the “bottom” part of the volumes appear to be
straight. This will hopefully become clear by looking at Fig. 5.
Figure 4a shows situations where there is no dominant strategy — the optimal one is
conditioned on the other species’ strategy. For instance, in Table 1 we show an example
of such payoff matrix. Here, the payoff of species X when it plays (n, s) (short for “not
sharing in the first time-step, and sharing in the second time-step”) and species Y plays
(s, s) is higher than when species X plays (n, n) while keeping Y ’s strategy the same.
While this may seem counter-intuitive, since the returns (in environmental information)
for species X when sharing information in the second time-step are not perceived by it due
to the locality of the look-ahead, it nevertheless increases its payoff since Y ’s population
mortality is increased. In Sec. 4 we discuss how such situations could be analysed.
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(a) No dominant
strategies
(b) Not sharing weakly
dominant
(c) Not sharing strictly
dominant
Figure 4: (see in colour) We analyse the payoff matrix resulting from initial values in
X × Y × R. We obtained five non-overlapped volumes classifying the strategies: (a)
The grey volume corresponds to initial values where the optimal strategy of species X is
conditioned on the strategy of species Y , and therefore there are no dominant strategies.
For all points above this volume, sharing information is weakly dominant. (b) The dark-red
volume corresponds to initial values where not sharing information is weakly dominant for
species X. (c) The red volume corresponds to initial values where not sharing information
is strictly dominant for species X. Finally, for all points below volume (c), species X will
get extinct independently of its behaviour.
For initial values where the amount of resources is higher than those of the volume of
Fig. 4a, sharing information is weakly dominant for species X. This situation corresponds
to amounts of resources such that the consumption of both populations after two time-
steps does not deplete them, and hence sharing information cannot hurt a species, since
its growth will not be affected. Moreover, sharing information would be beneficial, in cases
where the other species shares back.
-0.35204577 -0.22381541 -0.20745971 -0.11033376
-0.35204577 -0.22381541 -0.16294896 -0.09836764
-0.35204577 -0.22381541 -0.20745971 -0.11033376
-0.35204577 -0.23964398 -0.16294896 -0.15442442
n, n n, s s, n s, s
n, n
n, s
s, n
s, s
Species Y
S
p
ec
ie
s
X
Table 1: Example of a payoff matrix where there is no dominant strategy for species X.
The initial values for this specific matrix where X = 0.5, Y = 0.2 and R = 1.8. Each cell
contains the growth rate of species X when each species plays the correspondent sequence
of actions.
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For cases where the potential benefits of having extra information from the other species
is always outweighed by the decrease in the populations due to the diminished resources,
then not sharing information is a strictly dominant strategy (see Fig. 4c). In Fig. 4b
we show the volume corresponding to initial values where not sharing is weakly dominant.
This volumes “encloses” the one shown in Fig. 4c, where initial values can be distinguished
within two types: in the first one, resources are sufficient for both species to share informa-
tion only in the first time-step, and therefore, species X achieves the same payoff playing
either (n, n) or (s, n) when Y plays either (n, n) or (s, n) (see Table 2). In these situations,
the reduction of resources after the first time-step makes sharing information damaging as
the subsequent action.
-0.46579296 -0.31965691 -0.27855031 -0.25980521
-0.48390350 -0.63747731 -0.34778310 -0.59688452
-0.46579296 -0.40127033 -0.27855031 -0.33887903
-0.59319779 -0.79195649 -0.44195076 -0.64172489
n, n n, s s, n s, s
n, n
n, s
s, n
s, s
Species Y
S
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ec
ie
s
X
Table 2: Typical payoff matrix where not sharing information is weakly dominant for
species X. The initial values for this specific matrix where X = 0.28, Y = 0.76 and
R = 1.8. Each cell contains the growth rate of species X when each species plays the
correspondent sequence of actions.
For the second type of initial values, sharing information in the second time-step causes
complete depletion of resources and therefore species’ X subsequent extinction. A typical
example of the payoff matrix for these cases is shown in Table 3, where we can see why
the strategy (n, n) is not strictly dominant: if a species shares information in the second
time-step, then species X will get extinct no matter what the other species does, obtaining
the same payoff for all the other species’ options. Let us note here that a growth rate
of −1.0 implies the extinction of the species, since this value is a lower bound for the
growth rate, and can only be achieved when the proportion of the population that acquired
environmental information is zero (which means that both populations completely die out).
Finally, for all initial values of X, Y and R below the volume shown in Fig. 4b, species
will go extinct independently of their behaviour.
As a complement, in Fig. 5 we show 2D plots by fixing the amount of resources to 10
different values, in each of these values analysing 2502 points uniformly distributed in X×Y .
The black zone corresponds to initial values of population densities in which species X go
extinct regardless of its strategy. In these plots, we can more clearly visualise the described
“enclosure” of the volume shown in Fig. 4c. Additionally, we can better appreciate the
relationship between resources and population densities. Relative terms used to describe
the amounts of resources such as “scarce” of “abundant” are directly correlated with the
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-0.59296608 -1.00000000 -0.52533449 -1.00000000
-1.00000000 -1.00000000 -1.00000000 -1.00000000
-0.65597890 -1.00000000 -0.59296600 -1.00000000
-1.00000000 -1.00000000 -1.00000000 -1.00000000
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Table 3: Typical payoff matrix where not sharing information is weakly dominant for
species X. The initial values for this specific matrix where X = 0.6, Y = 0.6 and R = 1.8.
Each cell contains the growth rate of species X when each species plays the correspondent
sequence of actions.
areas shown in the plots. For instance, scarce resources are in correspondence with red,
dark-red and black areas; while abundant resources are in correspondence with green areas.
As resources increase in absolute values, the range of population densities for which
resources are scarce gets smaller. In Fig. 5f, for instance, we see the red area surrounded
by the dark-red areas, where values of X between the red and grey areas are those of the
type exemplified by the payoff matrix shown in Table 2; and those between the red and
the black areas are those of the type exemplified by the payoff matrix shown in Table 3.
The scarcity area disappears approximately when R ≥ 2.4. Opposed to this scenario,
when resources decrease, the range of population densities for which resources are abundant
also gets reduced, corresponding only to small population densities (see Fig. 5a and 5b for
examples). In grey areas, resources can be considered neither scarce nor abundant. This
area presents an incentive for species to coordinate behaviour, as we discuss in Sec. 4.1.
For resources values approximately of R > 2.8, then sharing information is always weakly
dominant.
4 Discussion
Our theoretical model integrates two behaviours of bacteria, bet-hedging and cell-to-cell
communication, which are usually studied in isolation [46]. Bacterial cells follow a bet-
hedging strategy, incorporating density-dependent environmental information into their
decision-making process. Therefore, a cell’s communication behaviour influences the long-
term growth rate of other cells. Assuming within-species communication, what can we say
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(g) R = 2.0
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(h) R = 2.3
Y population density
(i) R = 2.8
Y population density
(j) R = 3.0
Figure 5: (see in colour) We analyse the payoff matrix from 2502 initial values of population
densities of species X and Y uniformly distributed in X ×Y , with the amount of resources
R fixed. Green points corresponds to sharing information being a weakly dominant strat-
egy for species X. Grey points corresponds to initial values where there is no dominant
strategy for species X. Red points represent values for which not sharing information is
strictly dominant for species X. Dark-red points corresponds to values where not sharing
information is weakly dominant for species X. Finally, black points represent values where
species X goes extinct regardless of its strategy.
about the dynamics of information exchange between species?
As we have seen, environmental information is translated into long-term growth rate.
Thus, cells that acquire environmental information will have an advantage over those that
do not. While acquiring information (other than that which a species already has) depends
solely on whether the other species shares information, the potential recipient species
can actively increase the amount of information the other species may provide in the
future, by sharing information with it. The cost of this investment is zero when resources
are sufficient for the consumption of both populations. Therefore, when resources are
abundant, cooperative strategies between species of bacterial cells will out-compete those
where none or only one of the species cooperate.
When the consumption of resources by the populations results in a reduction of re-
sources, then the cost of sharing information is not zero any more, and it is related to the
loss in the species’ environmental information caused by the diminished proportion of cells
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perceiving the environment. In cases where a species does not share back information, the
other species will always lose its investment in the first species’ growth. On the other hand,
when the first species does share in return, and depending on initial values, it may pay off
to invest. These situations correspond to the volume shown in Fig. 4a, where there are no
dominant strategies.
As resources become scarcer, the cost of sharing information becomes higher, and even-
tually the losses caused by the other species having extra information outweigh any possible
benefit (volumes in Fig. 4b and Fig. 4c). In this scenario, bacterial cells developing an
antagonistic behaviour will out-compete those that do not.
It becomes clear from our analysis that there is an indirect cost for sharing information
which is relative to the amount of resources and to the population densities. As noted
in [31], the immediate cost of sharing information is different from that of sharing a re-
source (such as food) (although there is evidence that there is a cost associated with signal
production in bacteria [28, 13], incorporating this feature in the model would not qualita-
tively change the results). Namely, in the latter, the shared amount equals the losses of
an organism and the gains of another, while in the former, as well as in our model, shar-
ing information does not incur any immediate cost. However, the indirect cost of sharing
information is given by the decrease in a species’ environmental information, which is zero
in abundance, and increases as resources become scarcer. Our model captures the relative
value of resources, which dominates the species’ communication behaviour.
The transition in the dominant strategy, from cooperation to antagonism, results from
a change in the availability of resources: in abundance, cooperative species out-compete
non-cooperative ones, while in scarcity, antagonistic species out-compete non-antagonistic
ones. This is supported by the results obtained in [53, 54], where there is also a tran-
sition from cooperation to defection depending on available resources. However, in this
work, cooperation results dominant in scarcity of resources, while defection is dominant
in abundance. Although the results seem contradictory, the difference comes from the as-
sumptions: for unlimited resources, cooperation, in our model, gives players an advantage,
while, in their model, defection does. Therefore, qualitatively, results support each other:
in our model, the game is equivalent to a Prisoner’s Dilemma in scarcity of resources and
to the Harmony Game in abundance; while in their resource model, the relationship is the
opposite.
Finally, a comment regarding the complexitiy of the computation for bacteria of the
communication strategy: contexts (initial values) where the species does not share infor-
mation belong to a well-defined region that can be approximated using a threshold value.
The same is valid for contexts where the species does share information. For contexts with
no dominant strategies, more complicated computations are needed. One prediction that
could be possible would be that simple organisms would either avoid this area because
it requires more complex computation, or indeed, that even very simple organisms that
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operate in this region do have more complex decision-making cascades. However, we are
cautious making a concrete numerical prediction, because for an experimental test a more
precise understanding of the dynamics will be necessary.
4.1 Possible analysis of the no-dominance volume
For situations where there is no dominant strategy, it would still be desirable to be able to
predict the communication behaviour of the species. In this transition, species would ben-
efit from predicting the other species’ behaviour, such that they can adjust their response
accordingly. This leads to two types of games: Snow Drift, where players benefit by playing
the opposite of the co-player; and Stag Hunt, where players benefit by coordinating their
actions. Or, it can result in a more intricate game, where a species would share as much
information as it can as long as it does not deplete the resources. In this case, the expected
outcome of an evolutionary process may be a mixed population of cells sharing information
and cells not sharing information; or we could have the species, at the population level,
choosing how much information to share with the other.
The latter could be analysed by allowing the species’ population to share partial in-
formation, and the Nash equilibria would indicate the possible outcomes. Here, it may
be interesting to consider if playing mixed strategies is equivalent (in utility, growth rate
in our case) to playing a linear mix of pure strategies, as it follows from any rational
agent satisfying the axioms as defined in [41]. For instance, if playing a linear mix of pure
strategies (i.e. sharing partial information) achieves a higher utility than playing mixed
strategies, then this may be indicative of the outcome of an evolutionary process where
there are no dominant strategies.
For the former case, we allow each cell to take two actions, sharing or not sharing their
information with the other species. This translates into n + 1 actions at the population
level, since cells are clones of each other, and it is sufficient to count how many cells share
information (n is the number of cells in the population).
4.2 Modelling bet-hedging mechanisms
In the presented model, we made a strong assumption in relation to the interpretation of the
information a species obtains. Namely, we assumed that all the information communicated
by one species was unambiguously interpreted by the other species, and vice versa, and
they were both able to translate this information into the optimal bet-hedging strategy.
However, in biological systems, information can be, for instance, ambiguous, meaningless
or false, leading to the implementation of sub-optimal bet-hedging strategies.
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The incorporation of a bet-hedging mechanism into the model would require explicitly
modelling the actions of cells, where an action is developing into a particular phenotype.
The policy of a cell would indicate how it translates the perceived information into actions.
Now, in order for cells to be able to communicate, one of the following properties need to
hold: either the identity of the sender is known, in which case the transmitted “message”
can be fully interpreted (further assuming absence of noise in the used channel); or they
would need to agree on a common language: that is, they would have identical (or similar)
policies for interpreting messages, such that, no matter who the sender is, the information
can still be interpreted [7, 8]. In other words, where identification of the sender is not
possible, then a common language is necessary in order to make sense of the information.
Such framework would allow further interesting dynamics, such as parasitism, where some
cells convey “false” information for the detriment of other cell’s predictions [8]. We believe
that these are essential aspects to include in the study of bet-hedging mechanisms.
4.3 Other interpretations of the model
Although we presented the model in a biological context, it could as well be considered in
other contexts, such as economics. For instance, we could think of two software companies
sharing the same market with the option to adopt two different models: open source or
closed source software production. Assuming a high demand for such products, a free flow
of innovations would allow higher growth rates (in terms of returns) for both companies,
while, when competing for demand, a closed source model would benefit both of them.
Particularly in our model, we could consider innovations to be environmental informa-
tion which is not already present in the collective information of a population. Then, if one
company is more proficient than another company in developing software for a particular
niche, the latter could benefit from the innovations of the former to expand its market (in
our model, we assume each species is more proficient in capturing different aspects of the
environment). Then, acquired innovations would be translated into higher growth rates.
It is important to note that, in our model (and under this consideration), innovations
are implicitly assumed to increase with population size (see Fig. 3). A more truthful
model should distinguish the information that is incorporated into a population (which
could be redundant, innovative, or of other types), as well as how the new information is
integrated with the existing information (whether it is compatible or not). Finally, our
model assumes that the knowledge of how to perform the actions necessary to survive for
certain conditions (develop a certain phenotype for bacteria, or, for a software company,
produce a particular code) is available for both species or companies, and thus innovations
here should be understood as new knowledge which improves the prediction of future
conditions.
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To consider other types of innovations, such as those that would allow the optimisation
of the processes producing the actions, or even innovations that would result in new actions
enabling expansion, a more comprehensive and complex model would be needed. These
types of innovations allow bacteria, for example, to incorporate traits through lateral gene
transfer such as antibiotic resistance, virulence attributes and metabolic properties [44]. In
the same way, software companies can integrate efficient modules performing specific tasks
into their projects. As stated above, the incorporation of foreign information raises issues
of redundancy and language compatibility, where reading a gene or executing a module
would have to be possible, and the results of such actions would have to be integrated with
the rest of the system.
In relation to this, we could also interpret our model in the framework of cellular
evolution, where there is a transition from horizontal exchange of genetic material be-
tween primitive cells (cooperation) to a stage dominated by vertical transfer (antagonism).
In early stages of evolution, primitive cells would constantly exchange genetic material
through horizontal gene transfer (HGT) [70, 71].These can be considered “innovations”,
and would allow them to achieve higher growth rates. However, this would also present the
problem we have just discussed about incorporating foreign information to a functioning
system. This problem was considered in [67], where they model the evolution of the genetic
code accounting for universality and optimality. In their work, they consider the genetic
code “not only as a protocol for encoding amino acid sequences in the genome, but also
an innovation-sharing protocol” [67]. While our model ignores the intricate aspects of ex-
change of genetic material, it offers a high level interpretation of the transition from HGT
to vertical gene transfer (VGT). Other studies investigated the evolution of the genetic
code in this context, serving also as inspiration for this work [47, 51, 43].
4.4 Stigmergy
As recently noted in a study of self-organisation in bacterial biofilms [21], bacterial commu-
nication can be considered as a type of stigmergy [22], where cells modify their environment
by releasing chemical signals and influence the behaviour of the cells perceiving them. This
results in a coordinated collective behaviour without the necessity of a central control. In
the mentioned study, the expansion in biofilms of the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa
is analysed. This bacterium has the ability to remodel its substratum to form an intercon-
nected network of trails, which guides the transit of cells, and uses extracellular DNA to
facilitate traffic flow through it [20, 21].
Many distinctions have been made on the concept of stigmergy, such as sematectonic
or marker-based [69], quantitative or qualitative [64]. These distinctions can be considered
orthogonal [45], and they are important to describe in more precision the system in ques-
tion: for instance, quorum sensing can be considered marker-based and quantitative, but
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also qualitative (bacteria recognises different chemical signals, for example in cross-species
talking). Other distinctions have been proposed, one related to the duration of modifi-
cations, transient or persistent, and the other related to the structure of the population,
termed broadcast or narrowcast [26].
Specifically in this study, we do not explicitly model the mentioned aspects of stigmergy,
but by considering our model in the framework of stigmergy, they contribute to more
accurately describe the assumptions made. First, the communication between cells is
assumed to be instantaneous and transient, since in every time-step the previously shared
information is not considered. Second, information is broadcasted, since every individual
cell perceives the output of every other cell. Third, information is qualitative, as shown
in Fig. 3, where the information of a population increases with population size. Finally,
whether communication is marker-based or sematectonic, nothing particular is assumed in
the model.
4.5 Multilevel selection
As mentioned in the introduction, we assumed in our model within-species communication
in order to simplify the game-theoretic analysis. However, it would be desirable to analyse
whether individual cells would share information with other cells of the same species or
not by considering a communication strategy for each cell.
However, in this scenario, natural selection would operate at multiple levels [39, 27],
and a preference between sharing information with the same species rather than with
other species may need to be considered. In our particular setting, species capture different
aspects of the environment on which they depend, and we can speculate that the preference,
at least initially, would be towards the other species, who contributes more to the total
environmental information (see Sec. 2.5.3).
This seems contrary to kin selection [24, 61], where individuals would prefer to cooperate
with individuals of the same species (and thus maximising inclusive fitness). Instead,
because of our assumption of global competition on resources, there is as much competition
between kins as there is between non-kins, and since the other species provides more
information about the environment, interactions with members of the other species would
be preferred. Had we assumed that the contribution in environmental information from
members of the same species was larger than that of the other, then the preference of
cooperation would be toward kins. For the latter situation, such behaviours have been
observed in the pathogen Pseudomonas aeruginosa [13]. Moreover, the same bacterium
diminishes kin cooperation as the scale of competition becomes more local [23]. The scale
at which species compete would have a significant effect in the communication behaviour
of individual cells [23, 48].
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5 Conclusion
To conclude, we presented an information-theoretic model which integrates two aspects
of bacterial behaviour, bet-hedging and cell-to-cell communication. While simple, several
important aspects of communication were captured by our model: we related the communi-
cation behaviour of species to the relative availability of resources, which can be classified
into three main regimes. Species cooperating in abundance of resources would benefit,
while they would behave antagonistically in scarcity. In this transition, for the situations
in-between, species would have an incentive to coordinate their behaviours, adapting in
response to each other’s strategies.
A Information theory
In this section we briefly introduce some basic concepts of Information theory. For an
in-depth treatment, we refer the reader to [10]. A measure for the uncertainty of a random
variable is given by the entropy of that random variable. For instance, the entropy of the
environment E for a set of environmental conditions E is defined as
H(E) = −
∑
e ∈ E
p(e) log2 p(e) (15)
The conditional entropy measures the uncertainty of a random variable once another
random variable has been observed. For instance, the uncertainty of the environment once
an individual i of species X has acquired information from its sensors is defined as
H (E | Sx) = −
∑
sx
p(sx)
∑
e
p (e | sx) log2 p (e | sx) (16)
The mutual information measures the reduction in the uncertainty of a random variable
due to the knowledge of another random variable. For instance, the reduction in the
uncertainty of the environment for an individual i of species X due to the knowledge of its
acquired sensory information is defined as
I(E ; Sx) = H(E)−H (E | Sx) =
∑
e,sx
p(e, sx) log2
p(e, sx)
p(e)p(sx)
(17)
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Finally, the Kullback-Leibler distance between two probability mass functions p(x) and
q(x) is defined as
D (p || q) =
∑
x∈X
p(x) log2
p(x)
q(x)
(18)
which is always non-negative and is zero if and only if the probabilities p and q are
equal.
B Efficient representation of the states of a popula-
tion
In a population of n individuals, where each of them can take 2 states, the number of
possible states that the population can take is 2n. Let s1, . . . , sn be the states of individuals
1, . . . , n, where si ∈ S is the state of individual i, with 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The probability of
the population to be in state s1, . . . , sn given some environmental conditions e is given
by p(s1, . . . , sn|e) = p(s1|e) . . . p(sn|e). Considering that conditional probabilities among
individuals of the same species are equal (see Eq. 2 and 3), then p(s1, . . . , sn|e) depend
solely on the number of occurrences of each state in S. For instance, if S = {0, 1}, then
p(0, 0, 1|e) = p(0, 1, 0|e) = p(1, 0, 0|e) = p(0|e)2p(1|e)1. In this way, the number of states of
the population grows linearly with population size (see [10] for a proof). Below, we show
how to compute Pr(S|E) (where S represents the state of the population as a unit) by
using the fact that individuals are indistinguishable.
Let s1, . . . , sn (or alternatively s) be a sequence of n states, where si ∈ S is the state
of individual i of species X, with 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The type Ps of a sequence s is a probability
distribution given by Ps(a) = N(a|s)/n for all a ∈ S, where N(a|s) is the number of times
state a occurs in the sequence s. The type class of a type P is defined as the set
T (P ) = {s ∈ Sn : Ps = P}
and the size of T (P ) is the number of ways of arranging N(s1|s), . . . , N(s|S||s) individ-
uals in a sequence, which is
|T (P )| =
(
n
N(s1|sx), . . . , N(s|S||sx)
)
=
n!
N(s1|sx)!× . . .×N(s|S||sx)!
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Since s1, . . . , sn given some environmental conditions e are drawn i.i.d according to Eq.
2 for species X of Eq. 3 for species Y , the probability of s depends only on its type and is
given by
p (s | e) = |T (Ps)| 2−n
(
H(Ps)+D(Ps||Pr(Si|e))
)
(19)
(see [10] for a proof). The number of states of the random variable S representing a
population of n individuals is given by the cardinal of the set of types,
|Pn| =
(( |S|
n
))
=
(
n+ |S| − 1
n
)
which is the number of n-multisubsets of the set S, i.e. the total number of combinations
of the states of n individual random variables, where each one can take any state of S,
counting permutations only once. In our case, where S = {0, 1}, the number of states of
the random variable S is n+ 1.
C Interpolation of conditional probabilities
Population densities in our model are represented by a value in the range [0, 1], and this
value is mapped to the actual number of individuals in the population, for instance for
species X this value is n = pt×Xt× 15. If n is an integer, then we proceed as explained in
appendix B. For other cases, let us assume the states of bnc individuals are represented in a
sequence sbnc, where each state is in S. As our model requires conditional probabilities for
continuous sequences, we define a surrogate sequence which adds a proportion λ of state
b ∈ S to sequence sbnc as s′(sbnc, b, λ), which we denote s′ for shortness when the arguments
can be deduced from context. Thus, we have |sbnc| ≤ |s′| ≤ |sbn+1c|, or equivalently
bnc ≤ |s′| ≤ bn+1c. We define the type of a sequence when adding a proportion λ of state
b to the sequence sbnc as
Ps′(sbnc,b,λ)(a) =

N(a|sbnc)+λ
bnc+λ a ∈ S, a = b
N(a|sbnc)
bnc+λ a ∈ S, a 6= b
(20)
For λ = 0 one has Ps′ = Psbnc , and for λ = 1 one has Ps′ = Psbn+1c .
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We should note that when 0 < λ < 1, the total number of states of the population is
|S|×|Pn|. Let us illustrate the states of a population when 0 < λ < 1 for a population that
consists of two individuals, where each individual can be in a state 0 or 1. The possible
states of this population are 3: 00, 01, and 11 (with type size 1, 2, 1, respectively). Now,
if we add a proportion 0 < λ < 1 of a state to each possible state of the population, then
we multiply by |S| the number of states (before shrinking when λ = 1, see Fig. 6).
0100 11
000λ 001λ 010λ 011λ 110λ 111λ
000 111
λ = 0
0 < λ < 1
λ = 1 001 011
Figure 6: States of a population in the transition from two to three individuals. We denote
a sequence s′(s, b, λ) as sbλ for shortness. For instance, (00,1,λ) is denoted 001λ.
We could consider the type size of each sequence by
|T (Ps′(sbnc,b,λ))| :=
( bnc+ λ
N(s1|sx), . . . , N(sb|sx) + λ, . . . , N(s|S||sx)
)
where the factorial is approximated by using the gamma function Γ (x) =
∞∫
0
tx−1e−tdt,
with (bnc + λ)! = Γ(bnc + λ + 1). However, when counting the unique ways of arranging
the states, for instance, 001λ and 010λ, we would not be considering the overlap between
these two states. In other words, we would be counting more than once some sequences.
This depends on the sequences and the value of λ, for example 000λ and 001λ fully overlap
when λ = 0, but there is no overlap when λ = 1. On the other hand, 001λ and 010λ do
not overlap when λ = 0, but fully overlap when λ = 1.
Then, some sequences (such as 001λ and 010λ) are always counted twice, independently
of the value of λ: they either overlap with one sequence or the other (this is because
we are considering |S| = 2). However, the sequences 000λ and 111λ (those such that
|T (P000λ)| = T (P111λ)| = 1) are counted twice when λ = 0, but only once when λ = 1. In
Fig. 7 we show some values of the sizes of types as λ increases.
Taking this into account, we approximate the conditional probability by
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λ = 0
0 < λ < 1
λ = 1 3 3
Figure 7: Sizes of types for sequences in the transition from two to three individuals in a
population. The sizes are corresponded with the sequences shown in Fig. 6, and the values
when 0 < λ < 1 show how they change from λ = 0 to λ = 1.
p(s′(sbnc, b, λ)|e) =

1+λ
|S| 2
−(bnc+λ)
(
H(Ps′ )+D(Ps′ ||Pr(S′|E))
)
if |T (Ps′)| = 1
|T (Ps′ )|
|S| 2
−(bnc+λ)
(
H(Ps′ )+D(Ps′ ||p(S′|E))
)
otherwise
(21)
D Parameters sensitivity and results generality
The parameter settings used in Sec. 3 were specially chosen to show the transition from
cooperation to antagonism in species sharing environmental information. These were α =
1.05, N = M = 15, together with the conditional probabilities shown in Eq. 2 and Eq.
3. Here, we analyse the sensitivity of the parameters by introducing changes in each one
of them and showing how this affects the results. Instead of computing the dominant
strategies for the same subset of X × Y ×R (as we have done in Sec. 3), we show results
for a fixed value of resources, R = 1.8, which clearly shows all the possible volumes (see
Fig. 5f).
In Table 4, we show the used parameters by the model with their descriptions. First,
let us consider parameter α, the growth rate of resources. In Fig. 8b, we show the results
we obtain when we change to α = 1.25, instead of its original value, α = 1.05, whose
results are shown in Fig. 8a. This change extends the volume where sharing information is
weakly dominant such that it includes initial values with relatively lower resources, while
the other volumes will be shifted in such a way that they are composed of initial values
with lower values for resources. Additionally, the amount of initial values composing the
other volumes is smaller. The reason for this is that, since resources grow at a higher
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Parameter Description
Pr (Sxi | E)
This conditional probability defines the amount of information that
an individual cell i of species X captures from sensing the environment.
Pr
(
Syj
∣∣ E) This conditional probability defines the amount of information that
an individual cell j of species Y captures from sensing the environment.
N Carrying capacity of the population of species X.
M Carrying capacity of the population of species Y .
α Growth rate of resources.
Table 4: List of parameters used by the model with their description.
rate, higher populations can be supported, and thus the regime in which antagonism is
dominant is reduced.
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(a) α = 1.05
Y population density
(b) α = 1.25
Y population density
(c) Pr(SXi |E) (2),
Pr(SYj |E) (3)
Y population density
(d) Pr(SXi |E) (22),
Pr(SYj |E) (23)
Figure 8: (see in colour) We analyse the payoff matrix from 2502 initial values of population
densities of species X and Y uniformly distributed in X ×Y , with the amount of resources
R = 1.8 fixed. See Fig. 5 for an explanation of what colors represent. Each subcaption
shows the parameter whose effect is being exemplified.
Let us consider now the conditional probabilities Pr(SXi |E) and Pr(SYj |E). They
determine how much environmental information each individual captures, I(E;SXi) =
I(E;SYj) = 0.39016 bits, which is a low amount of the total environmental uncertainty,
H(E) = 2 bits. Together with N and M , the conditional probabilities determine the
different curves shown in Fig. 3. A property of the defined conditional probabilities is that
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populations achieve a fast increase in environmental information when population densities
are low, with small increases for high population densities. Lower values of I(E;SXi) and
I(E;SYj) would have a slower growth for low population densities, and species will not
acquire high amounts of environmental information for high population densities (see Fig.
9 for an example).
Therefore, the two conditional probabilities together with N and M will define the total
environmental information when species communicate. This amount is
I(E;SX1 , . . . , SXn , SY1 , . . . , SYm) (see the curve in Fig. 3 and in Fig. 9), and the gain in
environmental information for a species receiving the shared information from the other
species (assuming equal population densities) is the difference between the two mentioned
curves. This difference is high for our chosen conditional probabilities since the species
were meant to capture different aspects of the environment (see Fig. 2 and 3), but if the
aspects of the environment that species capture intersect, then this difference decreases
(see, for instance, Fig. 9).
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Figure 9: Total amount of environmental information for different scenarios (using con-
ditional probabilities 22 and 23): I(E;SXi) and I(E;SYj) correspond to the case where
an individual cell i of species X and an individual cell j of species Y acquire information
from their sensors only, respectively. I(E;SX1 , . . . , SXn) is the total amount of information
of each cell of species X when n cells communicate; in the same way I(E;SY1 , . . . , SYm)
is the total amount of information of each cell of species Y when m cells communicate.
I(E;SX1 , . . . , SXn , SY1 , . . . , SYm) is the total amount of environmental information each cell
of both population have when n cells of species X and m cells of species Y communicate.
Finally, H(E) is the uncertainty of the environment.
In Fig. 8c and Fig. 8d, we show how changing the conditional probabilities Pr(Sxi|E)
and Pr(SYj |E) affect the results. Instead of the probabilities defined in Eq. 2 and in
Eq. 3, we used the ones defined in Eq. 22 and in Eq. 23, where the intersection of
the acquired environmental information from sensors between two individuals of different
species is I(SXi ;SYj) = 0.151452 bits, while the amount of environmental information
each individual captures is roughly the same as before, I(E;SXi) = I(E;SYj) = 0.389767
bits. However, how the amount of environmental information changes in relation to the
population densities is different from the original definitions, as shown in Fig. 9.
In this case, a species by itself is able to capture more information about the environ-
ment (roughly 1.5 bits while before it was close to 1 bit). Therefore, higher populations
will consume more resources than before even when they do not exchange information,
and, as a consequence, the area where species always get extinct (the black area) now
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includes initial conditions where before they could survive by not sharing information (see
Fig. 8c and 8d, initial conditions that were dark red are now black). Similarly, the area
where not sharing information is strictly dominant now also contains initial values that
originally were classified as not sharing weakly dominant. The reason for this is the same
as mentioned: species by themselves capture more information than before, and therefore
the consumption of resources is higher even when species share information only in the first
time-step (such situations are exemplified in Table 2). Another consequence of the defined
conditional probabilities is that the area where species cooperate was slightly extended.
This happens because the amounts of consumed resources for high population densities
decreased in comparison to our original parameters, since high population densities now
possess less environmental information.
Pr (SXi | E) :=

s1 s2
e1 0.95 0.05
e2 0.65 0.35
e3 0.35 0.65
e4 0.05 0.95
 (22) Pr (SYi | E) :=

s1 s2
e1 0.05 0.95
e2 0.35 0.65
e3 0.65 0.35
e4 0.95 0.05
 (23)
To summarise, changes in the parameters can extend or reduce the initial conditions
where species cooperate, and they also can extend or reduce the initial conditions where
species get extinct independently of their strategies. These changes also affect the initial
conditions where there is no dominant strategy, where not sharing is strictly dominant, and
where not sharing is weakly dominant. However, in the results there is always a transition
from cooperative strategies to antagonistic strategies, and the parameters we chose are
ones that clearly show it.
E Different dynamics for resources
In the model, we defined a dynamics for resources such that they grow at a rate of α
unless they are exhausted, in which case they remain in that state. Here, we consider a
periodic replenishment of resources which is independent of the current amount available
for bacteria. The dynamics are shown in Eq. 24.
Rt+1 := Rt − (Xt + Yt) + β (24)
In this equation, resources are consumed proportionally to the sum of the population
densities, and they are replenished by an amount β. We would like to test whether this
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change affects the observed transition from cooperation to antagonism in information ex-
change. For this purpose, we re-run the experiments of Sec. 3, but instead of using Eq. 10
in the model, we use the one defined in this section, Eq. 24, with a value β = 0.05 (this
value has been chosen particularly to show the transition of regimes from cooperation to
antagonism).
The plots shown in Fig. 10 are very similar to the ones shown in Fig. 5, the latter
corresponding to the figures obtained from the original simulations. The difference that
stands out between the two experiments happens for population densities close to their
carrying capacity. In the original simulations, such population densities went extinct inde-
pendently of their actions. In the current consideration, not sharing information is weakly
dominant. Before, large populations would exhaust resources, and, since they were never
replenished, both species would die out. Now, resources are may be fully consumed, but
they would be replenished in any case.
X
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
d
e
n
si
ty
Y population density
(a) R = 0.4
Y population density
(b) R = 0.9
Y population density
(c) R = 1.2
Y population density
(d) R = 1.4
Y population density
(e) R = 1.6
X
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
d
e
n
si
ty
Y population density
(f) R = 1.8
Y population density
(g) R = 2.0
Y population density
(h) R = 2.3
Y population density
(i) R = 2.8
Y population density
(j) R = 3.0
Figure 10: (see in colour) We analyse the payoff matrix from 2502 initial values of popu-
lation densities of species X and Y uniformly distributed in X × Y , with the amount of
resources R fixed. Green points corresponds to sharing information being a weakly dom-
inant strategy for species X. Grey points corresponds to initial values where there is no
dominant strategy for species X. Red points represent values for which not sharing infor-
mation is strictly dominant for species X. Dark-red points corresponds to values where
not sharing information is weakly dominant for species X. Finally, black points represent
values where species X goes extinct regardless of its strategy.
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